What Hume might have said to Kant
pp. 164-170
Abstract
The aim of this brief essay is to present some conjectures as to how Hume might have criticized certain central epistemological doctrines of Kant.1 By a natural extension of this theme I shall also raise a few questions concerning Karl Popper's views on induction and his critique of the empiricist meaning criterion. I do this in the spirit of my very great admiration for Popper's work and his friendship, which I cherish sincerely. If I have misunderstood his basic outlook, I hope that he will set me right in future discussions.
Publication details
Published in:
Feigl Herbert (1981) Inquiries and provocations: selected writings 1929–1974. Dordrecht, Springer.
Pages: 164-170
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-010-9426-9_10
Full citation:
Feigl Herbert (1981) What Hume might have said to Kant, In: Inquiries and provocations, Dordrecht, Springer, 164–170.