In his paper, Professor Thalberg focuses upon one sort of circumstance under which we might wish to speak of motivational disturbance, namely, that in which a person has urges, feelings, and perhaps even beliefs which strike that person as foreign. Thalberg uses the term "attitude" to apply to whatever urges, feelings, etc., we may be said to act on. I take it that these are said to be "foreign" or "alien" because, although perhaps they are familiar, they seem to the person to be incoherent with the rest of the person's beliefs, feelings, and (I would add) habits. The question regarding motivational disturbances which interests Thalberg is how such attitudes make the actions which they engender unfree, or, at any rate, less free. The aspects of this question which Thalberg addresses in this paper is whether the constraint in these cases is very much like that which exists in cases of outright coercion. There is a prima facie resemblance between cases of motivational disturbance as defined above, and cases of acting under coercion in that in both cases the person performs the action, as opposed to merely being acted upon. But in each sort of case an alien factor is "crucial" in Thalberg's sense, i.e., it is necessary if the act is to be performed at all. In each sort of case we might want to regard this as a constraint which interferes with acting freely, i.e., as something which interferes with doing what one wants. Thalberg thinks that we can. However, as Thalberg points out, it is rather paradoxical to say that people are constrained in cases of motivational disturbance, since in such cases the person wants (or has an impulse, etc.) to do something and does it. But wanting to do something and doing it is usually what is thought to characterize acting freely. Thalberg then offers a non-hierarchical analysis of coerced action, and argues that neither in the case of coerced action, nor in the case of action due to disturbed attitudes, is it correct to say that the person really did not want to perform the action in question. However, he argues that there the analogy ends, and that motivational disturbances are not amenable to the same sort of analysis as coerced action. The issues raised in Professor Thalberg's paper may help us better understand, first, how free action is compromised by motivational disturbance, and, second, how diminution of these conditions increases freedom of action. I shall be somewhat selective about the parts of his paper on which I comment upon in detail.