A consideration of Ludwik Fleck's "Contributions to Epistemology", which is our present theme, is confronted first of all with the difficulty of having to differentiate between the philosophy of science (Wissenschaftstheorie ) and epistemology (Erkenntnistheorie ). In my opinion, the two disciplines differ from one another not only in so far as their statements' claims to validity are concerned, but also in what they attempt to emphasize about the objects on which they reflect. Epistemology is understood here as a part of philosophy, as a discipline which, like philosophy, is concerned with a fundamental orientation of the totality of human action in society, and which thus, unlike philosophy of science, is concerned not only with one particular area of human activity. Although its author only uses the term "epistemology" for it, Fleck's work is primarily one of the philosophy of science. The social and historical character of a certain area of human work, i.e., of scientific work, must be made known. But in Fleck's efforts to fulfil this purpose, he is forced — to some extent implicitly but to some extent also explicitly — to refer to characteristics that go beyond the specificity of scientific knowledge and are involved in human knowledge in general. To that extent Fleck's epistemology is made clear by means of his philosophy of science. In reference to the latter, we must also begin with Fleck's epistemology.