Book | Chapter
Fleck's contribution to epistemology
pp. 287-307
Abstract
Ludwik Fleck situated himself epistemologically in opposition to the two most prominant schools of the philosophy of science of his time: the Logical Positivism of Carnap, Schlick and others of the Vienna Circle, and the Historicism of Durkheim, Levy-Bruhl, Jerusalem and the sociologists of knowledge (46-51)1. A brief statement of where he stood with respect to each is helpful.
Publication details
Published in:
Cohen Robert S, Schnelle Thomas (1986) Cognition and fact: materials on Ludwik Fleck. Dordrecht, Springer.
Pages: 287-307
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-4498-5_15
Full citation:
Heelan Patrick A (1986) Fleck's contribution to epistemology, In: Cognition and fact, Dordrecht, Springer, 287–307.