Preuves et jeux sémantiques
pp. 105-123
Abstract
Hintikka makes a distinction between two kinds of games: truthconstituting games and truth-seeking games. His well-known game-theoretical semantics for first-order classical logic and its independence-friendly extension belongs to the first class of games. In order to ground Hintikka’s claim that truth-constituting games are genuine verification and falsification games that make explicit the language games underlying the use of logical constants, it would be desirable to establish a substantial link between these two kinds of games. Adapting a result from Thierry Coquand, we propose such a link, based on a slight modification of Hintikka’s games, in which we allow backward playing for ∃loïse. In this new setting, it can be proven that sequent rules for first-order logic, including the cut rule, are admissible, in the sense that for each rule, there exists an algorithm which turns winning strategies for the premisses into a winning strategy for the conclusion. Thus, proofs, as results of truth-seeking games, can be seen
Publication details
Published in:
Rebuschi Manuel, Tulenheimo Tero (2004) Logique & théorie des jeux. Philosophia Scientiae 8 (2).
Pages: 105-123
DOI: 10.4000/philosophiascientiae.567
Full citation:
Bonnay Denis (2004) „Preuves et jeux sémantiques“. Philosophia Scientiae 8 (2), 105–123.