Mohanty's account of the complementarity of descriptive and interpretive phenomenology
pp. 239-245
Abstract
[b]oth sorts of phenomenology—descriptive as well as interpretive—can be either naive or self-critical. When they are naive, they perceive each other as opposed. When they are self-critical, they recognize each other as complementary, and, in fact, as mutually inseparable.1
Publication details
Published in:
Hopkins Burt C (1993) Intentionality in Husserl and Heidegger: the problem of the original method and phenomenon of phenomenology. Dordrecht, Springer.
Pages: 239-245
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-015-8145-5_14
Full citation:
Hopkins Burt C (1993) Mohanty's account of the complementarity of descriptive and interpretive phenomenology, In: Intentionality in Husserl and Heidegger, Dordrecht, Springer, 239–245.