Incoherence of the mind-dependence of becoming
pp. 167-177
Abstract
In my Tensed Theory of Time, I argued that the B-theorist's objections to the reality of temporal becoming were not insoluble and that, on the contrary, there were positive advantages to be had from adopting a metaphysics of temporal becoming. Moreover, we have seen in chapter 6 that the B-theoretical assertion of the mind-dependence of becoming had little by way of positive argument to commend itself. Now we may supplement those conclusions by showing that the B-theoretical denial of temporal becoming is in fact incoherent.
Publication details
Published in:
Craig William Lane (2000) The tenseless theory of time: a critical examination. Dordrecht, Springer.
Pages: 167-177
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-017-3473-8_8
Full citation:
Craig William Lane (2000) Incoherence of the mind-dependence of becoming, In: The tenseless theory of time, Dordrecht, Springer, 167–177.