The meta-narratives of law refer to a modern conception of law and society, as expressed in the various theories on the allocation of legal rights and duties among the legal subjects, on allocation of legal power to the officials, and the allocation of scarce resources in society. Radical decisionism rejects all feasible meta-contexts or meta-narratives of the law, opting for a purely contextual notion of legal or, rather, political decision-making. As examples of radical decisionism, attention is given to two theories here: Thomas Wilhelmsson's idea of the small-scale, good narratives of legal responsibility and Martti Koskenniemi's idea of the lawyer's radically situationist ethics. According to Wilhelmsson, the post-modern condition of law has left us (almost) empty-handed, with just a bunch of fragmented legal doctrines and a profound disbelief in the validity of any wide-ranging theories of law. Therefore, 'small-scale, good narratives of legal responsibility" is all we may legitimately hope for. However, the grip of modernity is not no easy to evade: what gives such small-scale narratives the quality of "good" is their linkage to the social values and objectives cherished the Nordic welfare state, bringing us back to square one. In Koskenniemi's CLS-inspired methodological deconstruction of the argumentation patterns of international law, the structure of international legal argument is proven inherently volatile when faced with the competing, mutually exclusive claims made by the parties to a legal dispute. In a hard case, traditional legal arguments may equally well – and equally poorly – be employed by both of the parties to a legal dispute. The only way out of the deadlock is promised by having recourse to radically situationist ethics. But why would such a model be any less vulnerable to the shattering touch of Koskenniemi's methodological deconstruction? Radical decisionism, it seems, is not an easy stance to maintain in legal analysis.