The problem upon which the present essay is focused "the prism of the public" strangely enough turns out to be essentially ignored by, while manifesting a salient presence within, what we usually call social phenomenology. It has been ignored in the sense of not being identified as a phenomenological problem par excellence and instead being left with an almost aristocratic condescension to positive sociological knowledge which operates on a rather high level of abstract theoretical analysis. At the same time, the problem "casts light on" or carries implications for any serious phenomenological study of everyday life inevitably and obstinately (although often latently) predetermining steps of analysis. In regard to positive sociological knowledge itself, it usually takes for granted this so-called "public life" (or public reason), not being itself capable of or not even attempting to reduce the objectivations of public life or to ascertain their genetic connection to intersubjective reality, respectively to the fundamental relationship between everyday life and a primordial public sphere.