Acta Structuralica

international journal for structuralist research

Book | Chapter

192893

Fictionalism

William Lane Craig

pp. 239-282

Abstract

Fictionalism accepts the neo-Quinean criterion of ontological commitment but denies that sentences involving quantification over or singular terms referring to abstract objects are true. The work of Hartry Field and Mark Balaguer serves to represent this approach. Fictionalism is defended against objections based on the obvious truth of elementary mathematics, the indispensability/applicability of mathematics, and the alleged incoherence of fictionalism. Fictionalism is found to be a viable option for theists who accept the traditional criterion of ontological commitment; but doubts about that criterion are expressed.

Publication details

Published in:

Craig William Lane (2017) God and abstract objects: the coherence of theism: aseity. Dordrecht, Springer.

Pages: 239-282

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-55384-9_7

Full citation:

Craig William Lane (2017) Fictionalism, In: God and abstract objects, Dordrecht, Springer, 239–282.