Acta Structuralica

international journal for structuralist research

Book | Chapter

189697

Are there pure forms of thought?

Moritz Schlick

pp. 358-366

Abstract

We come now to examine the last possibility that might still hold out some hope of an a priori knowledge of reality. Perhaps concepts can supply what intuition is unable to provide. Perhaps Kant is right when he says that our thought can make apodictically valid judgments about empirical reality because thought itself participates in the construction of empirical objects, because nothing can become an object for us without having been given its form by the ">categories.

Publication details

Published in:

Schlick Moritz (1974) General theory of knowledge. Dordrecht, Springer.

Pages: 358-366

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-7091-3099-5_39

Full citation:

Schlick Moritz (1974) Are there pure forms of thought?, In: General theory of knowledge, Dordrecht, Springer, 358–366.