Book | Chapter
The subjectivity of the sense qualities
pp. 264-272
Abstract
In order to find out which properties may and which may not be ascribed to things-in-themselves, we must refer back to those considerations that led us to assume that things-in-themselves do exist. For, according to what was said in § 27, the grounds for this assumption already contain the grounds for any determination or definition of such things.
Publication details
Published in:
Schlick Moritz (1974) General theory of knowledge. Dordrecht, Springer.
Pages: 264-272
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-7091-3099-5_30
Full citation:
Schlick Moritz (1974) The subjectivity of the sense qualities, In: General theory of knowledge, Dordrecht, Springer, 264–272.