Acta Structuralica

international journal for structuralist research

Book | Chapter

189684

Critique of the notion of immanence

Moritz Schlick

pp. 203-233

Abstract

There is no question but that in everyday judgments as in scientific ones we constantly talk of objects not given to any consciousness. I speak of the manuscripts now in my desk even though they are not being perceived at this moment by me or by anyone else; I cannot perceive them through the desk. True, the elements, of which (according to Mach) they are complexes, have often been given to me, and I can bring them to "givenness' at any time. All I need do is open the drawer and turn my gaze in a certain direction or let my hands carry out certain movements of touching. The situation is similar with all objects of everyday life. The man in the street is interested only in things that are, have been, or can be perceived by him or his fellow man. But science goes beyond this to things that, in virtue of its own principles, cannot be given to man. It makes judgments about the interior of the sun, about electrons, about magnetic field strengths (for which we do not possess any sense organs) and so forth. What meaning is there in these statements?

Publication details

Published in:

Schlick Moritz (1974) General theory of knowledge. Dordrecht, Springer.

Pages: 203-233

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-7091-3099-5_26

Full citation:

Schlick Moritz (1974) Critique of the notion of immanence, In: General theory of knowledge, Dordrecht, Springer, 203–233.