We have seen that the theory of self-evidence is full of discrepancies and contradictions. And we have ascertained the proton pseudos of all these confusions: that those who use the expressions 'self-evidence" (Evidenz) and "is evident" (einleuchten) speak and reason as if consciousness stood there face to face with and inspecting truths and the facts of its own consciousness. (Thus Stumpf says: "We designate as immediately given that which is immediately evident as a fact⁴³.") And then of course they require a special criterion by which to determine whether the inspection has been correct. But this is precisely what self-evidence is supposed to provide. To be sure, they cannot conceal from themselves the circumstance that one's own thought processes are not facts foreign to consciousness, but form part of it. Nevertheless, they persist in thinking of them as severed from the subject or the "I", only then to tie them intimately to it again by an act supposed to be quite similar to the one which we imagine as setting up a connection between consciousness and things outside of consciousness: the act of perception.