In The Phenomenology of Mind, Hegel began his study of the genesis of consciousness with the immediate certainty of the particular object given as such to intuition. It is clear that a "given' of this kind is "immediate' only in a strictly relative manner: the "this' intended in sensible certainty is already an object, and as such implies a form of intentionality that has been able to appear only after a long process of constitution. Conceptual dialectic was incapable of clarifying, on the properly sensible plane, the lived moment that Hegel had recognized, however confusedly, in the Lectures at Jena. Here is the place that the superiority of the intuitive method, as it was practiced by Husserl, was revealed. For the first time, the pure description of lived experience made possible the explanation of the significations that are constitutive of the sensible object as such. The "thing' given in antepredicative perception already implies the moments of quality (i.e., spatiotemporal and substantial permanence): hence it can be understood only in terms of a genesis that goes through the stages of impression, sensation, sensorial field, and object-phantom. Correlatively, we have, on the "noetic' plane and outside of the pure present, the "immanent' intentionalities of retention and protention, and the first "transcendent' intentionality as the perception of the phantom.