Acta Structuralica

international journal for structuralist research

Book | Chapter

179969

Gelb-Goldstein's concept of "concrete" and "categorical" attitude and the phenomenology of ideation

Aron Gurwitsch

pp. 119-142

Abstract

Husserl's theory of universals as general objects and specific ideal entities has very soon acquired widespread notoriety not, however, without too often being grossly misinterpreted and misrepresented, partly on account of the not very fortunately chosen term of "intuition of essences" ("Wesenserschauung"). When Husserl established his theory of ideation for the first time in Logische Untersuchungen, he hardly went beyond asserting the specific nature and irreducibility of those acts through which universals in contradistinction to particular things are meant and apprehended and, correspondingly, also the specific nature and irreducibility of the objects apprehended through the acts in question. For this purpose, Husserl had to engage himself in a thoroughgoing analysis and discussion of the theories of abstraction prevailing in the tradition of classical British empiricism.

Publication details

Published in:

Simmel Marianne L. (1968) The reach of mind: essays in memory of Kurt Goldstein. Dordrecht, Springer.

Pages: 119-142

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-40265-8_10

Full citation:

Gurwitsch Aron (1968) „Gelb-Goldstein's concept of "concrete" and "categorical" attitude and the phenomenology of ideation“, In: M. L. Simmel (ed.), The reach of mind, Dordrecht, Springer, 119–142.