Book | Chapter
The idea of levels (Stufen) in the philosophical tradition
pp. 192-204
Abstract
In the present chapter those elements of the philosophical tradition which may be said to involve a structure of levels are examined (7.1). The analysis begins with some miscellaneous remarks about several doctrines which seem to be of this kind (7.2–7.4). As for second intentions (the most suitable theme for comparison with Frege's and contemporary logic's levels), little research has been done which could serve as a starting point. After examining three important cases (Aquinas, Scotus, Ockham 7 51–7.53), I propose some general considerations about the usual manner of presenting second intentions in traditional textbooks (7.54). Although Nizolius' contribution to second intentions seems to be unimportant, he is the only (known) "extensionalist" thinker of the philosophical tradition, and to this extent it was necessary to inquire whether he had classes of classes (7.55). In modern philosophy, second intentions and predicates of predicates no longer attract the attention of philosophers (7.56). Finally, Brentano's views (7.57) are examined and the chapter is completed by a brief reference to Platonism and levels (7.58).
Publication details
Published in:
Angelelli Ignacio (1967) Studies on Gottlob Frege and traditional philosophy. Dordrecht, Reidel.
Pages: 192-204
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-017-3175-1_8
Full citation:
Angelelli Ignacio (1967) The idea of levels (Stufen) in the philosophical tradition, In: Studies on Gottlob Frege and traditional philosophy, Dordrecht, Reidel, 192–204.