Poststructuralist philosophy has attracted considerable critique from many perspectives. Rationalists, neo-conservatives, liberals, Marxists, critical theorists of the Frankfurt School, proponents of hermeneutics, structuration theory, and critical theory, and even some Lacanians have raised serious objections about different aspects of its ontology and its substantive concepts and logics. One line of criticism has focussed on the difficulties of developing and translating its abstract concepts and logics into a viable social and political theory. This task is awkward because unlike other traditions in this field — for example, Marxism or structuration theory — there is considerable disagreement about the meaning and scope of poststructuralism. (Indeed, as I have already noted, there are many theorists who are sceptical about the very idea of a poststructuralist tradition of social theory.) Not unlike earlier debates about postmodernism, one immediate issue concerns the awkward status of the prefix "post' in the name "poststructuralism'. Other critiques are directed at the philosophical presuppositions of poststructuralism, especially the alleged valourization of language and meaning in the social sciences, as well the downplaying of "reality' and "material conditions'. A further set of questions is raised about the substantive content of the approach, especially its ability to tackle the problems of social structures and institutions, as well as its conceptions of subjectivity, agency, power, identity, and domination.