Consequentialism and bayesian rationality in normal form games
pp. 187-196
Abstract
In single-person decision theory, Bayesian rationality requires the agent first to attach subjective probabilities to each uncertain event, and then to maximize the expected value of a von Neumann—Morgenstern utility function (or NMUF) that is unique up to a cardinal equivalence class. When the agent receives new information, it also requires subjective probabilities to be revised according to Bayes' rule.
Publication details
Published in:
Leinfellner Werner, Köhler Eckehart (1998) Game theory, experience, rationality: foundations of social sciences, economics and ethics. In honor of John C. Harsanyi. Dordrecht, Springer.
Pages: 187-196
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-017-1654-3_16
Full citation:
Hammond Peter J. (1998) „Consequentialism and bayesian rationality in normal form games“, In: W. Leinfellner & E. Köhler (eds.), Game theory, experience, rationality, Dordrecht, Springer, 187–196.