One of the central topics of concern for contemporary philosophers, both analytical and phenomenological, has been the nature of meaning. Members of both groups have intimated on more than one occasion that the domain of meaning(s) is the exclusive preserve and only battleground of philosophy. Many of these same philosophers have also suggested that the only way in which one can reach this domain is through an examination of language. What I wish to do in this paper is not so much to question these doctrines as to try to make them clear in the way in which they are held by particular philosophers. More specifically, I wish to discuss some of Heidegger's views on meaning and language, and then, by some critical comparisons with both the "earlier" and the "later" Wittgenstein, to show the philosophical peculiarities of both men's positions — positions which, as I shall argue, are intriguingly similar. If successful, my essay can be construed, then, roughly speaking, as a building block in the service of rapprochement. But rapprochement is only valuable as an ideal if it is in turn put in the service of philosophy. I shall conclude, therefore, not on a note of comparison but with a question which I think needs posing and for which I cannot provide an answer. My essay divides quite naturally into three sections. In the first I shall discuss Heidegger's understanding of meaning.